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OPINION 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 Petitioners Vasil Abulashvili and Teona Klibadze seek review 
of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissing their 
application for withholding of removal and protection under the 
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) and an order of the BIA 
denying their motion to reopen.  For the reasons explained below, 
we hold that the BIA erred in dismissing the Petitioners‟ application 
for asylum because the agency‟s adverse credibility determination is 
not supported by substantial evidence.  We also hold that the BIA 
abused its discretion in denying the motion to reopen.  Finally, we 
hold that Petitioners‟ due process rights were violated when 
Immigration Judge Annie S. Garcy completely took over the cross-
examination for government‟s counsel, and thereby ceased 
functioning as a neutral arbiter.  We will therefore grant the petition 
for review, vacate the BIA‟s orders, and remand the case to the BIA 
for further proceedings. 
 
I.   Factual Background and Procedural History 
 
 Vasil Abulashvili and his wife, Teona Klibadze, are citizens 
of Georgia, a former U.S.S.R. republic.  They entered the United 
States on visitor visas in 1999 and remained longer than authorized.  
On December 20, 2004, Abulashvili filed an affirmative application 
for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT.   
Klibadze was included in the application as a derivative beneficiary 
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of Abulashvili's asylum claim.
1
   Abulashvili was thereafter placed 
in removal proceedings, where he renewed and updated his 
application for asylum.   
A. Asylum Application 
 
In his asylum application, Abulashvili claimed that he had 
been persecuted in Georgia on account of his membership in the 
opposition Labor Party of Georgia (“LPG”).  He explained that his 
troubles began in September of 1998, when the passenger minibus 
he was driving was flagged down by some armed men at the side of 
the road.   He asserted that one of the men said that his car had 
broken down and asked that he and his passenger be taken to the 
home of Koba Buchukuri, the head of the Dusheti district.  
Abulashvili believed that the passenger of the car was a foreigner, 
and that the driver was his interpreter.  Abulashvili claimed that he 
had no choice but to comply because the interpreter appeared visibly 
afraid of the foreigner and told Abulashvili that the foreigner was a 
“real crook.”  (A.R. 347).  Both individuals got into Abulashvili‟s 
minibus.   
 
Abulashvili stated that he drove the foreigner and his 
interpreter to Buchukuri‟s mansion, where Abulashvili waited (as 
requested) until they returned from their meeting. He claimed that, 
as he waited, he photographed two individuals leaving the mansion.  
Abulashvili stated in his application that he had heard that 
Buchukuri and his wife Martina Moldinin, who was a member of the 
Georgian Parliament, were corrupt and he wanted to record who had 
been in the mansion.   
 
Abulashvili stated that the foreigner and his interpreter 
returned from the meeting  together with a man of Chechen descent.
2
  
As Abulashvili resumed driving, he heard the Chechen and the 
foreigner conversing in Arabic.  Abulashvili stated that, at some 
point during the conversation, the foreigner pulled out a gun and 
began threatening the Chechen, causing the other passengers to 
panic.  Abulashvili stopped the minibus at that point and several 
passengers jumped out.  Abulashvili claimed that the foreigner then 
                                              
1
 Because Abulashvili is the lead petitioner and Klibadze is 
only seeking coverage as a dependent spouse, we will use 
Abulashvili‟s name alone when referring to the petitioners.   
2
 Abulashvili claimed that he also picked up additional 
passengers en route to Akhmeta. 
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fired several shots at the Chechen, who fled the scene.  One of the 
shots hit an 18-year- old female passenger.   
 
According to the asylum application, Abulashvili drove the 
bleeding girl to a nearby hospital in Akhmeta.  The interpreter 
accompanied Abulashvili to the hospital, and told Abulashvili that 
he would not testify about the shooting because Buchukuri and other 
members of the government were likely involved and he was 
worried about his safety.   Abulashvili asserted that the girl never 
regained consciousness and later died in the hospital. 
 
Abulashvili also claimed that when police subsequently 
questioned him about the shooting, he explained what had happened 
but did not reveal that he had taken photographs while waiting 
outside Buchukuri‟s home.  Abulashvili was held in the police 
station overnight and, upon his release, the police chief warned him 
that he should forget everything that had happened. 
 
According to the asylum application, Abulashvili gave the 
film containing the pictures he had taken outside of Buchukuri‟s 
home to the LPG Chairman, Shalva Natelashvili.  Shortly afterward, 
an unknown individual called Abulashvili, questioned his visit to the 
LPG office, and urged him to mind his own business.  The 
application also noted that the police stopped Abulashvili on October 
6, 1998 while he was driving his minibus route and interrogated him 
about his visit to the LPG office.  Abulashvili stated that during the 
ensuing detention, officers held him upside down, beat him, and 
threatened to kill him if he revealed what had happened during the 
September 1998 incident.  He was released three days later.   
 
Abulashvili claimed that he moved out of his apartment after 
his arrest because he feared that the police would continue to harass 
him.  Abulashvili also asserted that in March of 1999 the Ministry of 
State Security came to his former apartment and arrested Guram 
Kraveishvili, Abulashvili‟s former roommate and fellow LPG 
member.
3
  Abulashvili alleged that members of the militia demanded 
that Kraveishvili tell them about Abulashvili‟s whereabouts, and that 
they beat Kraveishvili when he refused to reveal any information.   
  
                                              
3
 As will be explained later in our opinion, Kraveishvili‟s last 
name has also been spelled as “Kravia Shvili” in the record.   
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 Three months later, on June 5, 1999, Abulashvili married 
Klibadze.  On the day of their wedding, Abulashvili claimed that he 
spotted the interpreter who had been in his minibus during the 
September 1998 shooting.  The asylum application also states that 
the interpreter and another man tracked Abulashvili down six weeks 
after the wedding.  They threatened to inform the police about 
Abulashvili‟s whereabouts unless he gave them $10,000.  According 
to the application, the men beat Abulashvili severely after he told 
them he could not pay that amount of money.  
  
 Abulashvili claimed that he later learned from a television 
news report that his former roommate (Kraveishvili) had been found 
dead.  Upon hearing this news, Abulashvili decided to leave Georgia 
permanently because it was no longer safe for him or his wife to 
remain there.  They left the country on August 20, 1999. 
B.  Proceedings Before Immigration Judge 
 
On March 24, 2006, the Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”) initiated removal proceedings against Abulashvili for 
remaining in the United States without proper authorization.   At a 
hearing before an Immigration Judge, Abulashvili conceded the 
charge of removability, but argued that he was entitled to relief 
based upon past persecution and fear of future persecution on 
account of his membership in the LPG opposition party, and his 
knowledge of government corruption as determined from the events 
in September 1998.  Abulashvili testified that he had a close 
association with the LPG party.   He also claimed that he had been 
involved in recruiting for the LPG and that the party had helped him 
establish his minibus service.   He stated that his father had been an 
active LPG member and had experienced trouble with government 
officials.  Abulashvili testified further that he believed that he would 
be harassed by those who had created problems for his father, 
including Koba Buchukuri, the once-head of the Dusheti district who 
was now the governor of Mtskheta-Tianeti.  Abulashvili stated that 
he feared that he would lose his life as well as his family if he 
returned to Georgia.   
  
 On cross-examination, an attorney for the government who 
had not been present at the first merits hearing began questioning 
Abulashvili.
4
  That attorney was apparently not familiar with the 
                                              
4
 The first merits hearing took place on May 4, 2006 but did 
not resume until August 15, 2006.  An Assistant Chief 
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record and woefully unprepared. He therefore confined his 
questioning to the number of times Abulashvili had been stopped by 
the police while living in the United States.  A few minutes into the 
questioning, the IJ took over the cross-examination after determining 
that the government‟s attorney was not prepared.      
C.  The Immigration Judge’s Decision 
 
 The IJ denied Abulashvili‟s asylum application on August 15, 
2006.  She determined that the application was untimely and that 
Abulashvili had failed to demonstrate that he qualified for an 
exception to the time limitation.  The IJ further held that even if 
Abulashvili had timely filed the application, he was still ineligible 
for relief because his claims were not credible. The IJ defended her 
decision to take over Abulashvili‟s cross-examination by noting that 
the government‟s attorney had not been prepared.  She explained 
that “[t]he Court is certain that in order to afford the respondent with 
due process and an opportunity to explain why his testimony in 
Court is different from his written application, someone needed to 
ask the respondent about it.”  (A.R. 89).  
 
Abulashvili appealed to the BIA, challenging the IJ‟s adverse 
credibility finding and contending that the IJ‟s role in questioning 
him violated his due process right to a neutral arbiter.  The BIA 
dismissed the appeal on May 30, 2008.  Like the IJ, the BIA was 
troubled that Abulashvili‟s asylum application did not claim that the 
root of his problems in Georgia could have been due to his father‟s 
political activism.  The BIA also rejected Abulashvili‟s claim that 
his due process rights had been violated.  The BIA concluded that 
the IJ was “ferreting out . . .  the facts” and “acquiring clarity in 
[Abulashvili‟s] testimony.”  (A.R. 421) 
 
We thereafter granted Abulashvili‟s motion to stay removal.  
Abulashvili then filed a motion to reopen with the BIA based on 
                                                                                                     
Counsel for DHS was present for Abulashvili‟s direct 
examination at the first hearing, but did not attend the 
subsequent hearing in August.  Instead, a different DHS 
attorney attended the August hearing in Yu‟s place.  The IJ 
noted that this switch in counsel was due to a “genuine mix 
up,” but it is unclear from the record why this mix up 
occurred.  (A.R. 64) 
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changed country conditions, which the BIA denied because it was 
untimely.
5
   
 
This petition for review followed.  The petition apparently 
does not challenge the denial of Abulashvili‟s untimely asylum 
application.  (See Pet.‟s Brief, at 11).6  Rather, Abulashvili only 
challenges the denial of his claim for withholding of removal and 
relief pursuant to the CAT.    
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
The BIA has jurisdiction over motions to reopen removal 
proceedings pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §  1003.2(a).  We have jurisdiction 
over Abulashvili‟s petition for review pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.   
 
“We review a final order of the BIA denying a motion to 
reopen for abuse of discretion.”  Mahmood v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 
248, 250 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).  Under this standard, we 
may reverse the BIA‟s denial of a motion to reopen if it is “arbitrary, 
irrational, or contrary to law.”  Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 
265 (3d Cir. 2008).   
 
Because the BIA‟s original order of removal adopted the 
findings of the IJ and discussed the reasons behind the IJ‟s decision, 
we review the decisions of both the IJ and the BIA.  See Zheng v. 
Gonzales, 417 F.3d 379, 381 (3d Cir. 2005).  “Adverse credibility 
determinations are factual findings subject to substantial evidence 
review.”  Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2003).  
We will defer to and uphold the IJ‟s adverse credibility 
                                              
5
  Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), Abulashvili should 
have filed his motion to reopen within 90 days of when the 
administrative decision became final, or by August 30, 2008.  
He did not file the motion until November 14, 2008.  
However, the 90-day time bar does not apply when, as here, 
an applicant alleges changed country conditions.  Filja v. 
Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 252 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 
6
 Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3), an alien has one year 
from time of entry to file for asylum absent “extraordinary 
circumstances,” which are not alleged here.  Tarrawally v. 
Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2003).  That time bar 
does not apply to requests for withholding of removal or 
relief under the CAT.     
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determination if it is “supported by reasonable, substantial, and 
probative evidence on the record considered as a whole,” INS v. 
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992), but such findings must be 
based on inconsistencies and improbabilities that “go to the heart of 
the asylum claim.” Id.; see also Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 
(3d Cir. 2002).
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III.  Discussion 
A. The Motion to Reopen 
 
Although Abulashvili‟s motion to reopen was untimely, the 
BIA may nonetheless consider the motion if it was “based on 
changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality.”  8 
CFR § 1003.2(c)(2).  Under these circumstances, an alien must: (1) 
produce evidence demonstrating that conditions have changed in his 
country of nationality; (2) demonstrate that this evidence is material; 
and (3) establish that the evidence was not available and could not 
have been presented at the previous proceeding.  Id.; see also Zheng 
v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir. 2008).   
 
Here, the BIA found that Abulashvili had met the first and 
third factors, but not the second.  Specifically, the BIA determined 
there were changed circumstances in Georgia resulting from the 
August 2008 conflict between Georgian and Russian forces, and 
acknowledged that this evidence could not have been presented at 
the previous proceeding.  However, the BIA concluded that the 
evidence was not material because major discrepancies between 
Abulashvili‟s asylum application and his hearing testimony 
established that his testimony was not credible.    
 
The first of these alleged discrepancies pertains to 
Abulashvili‟s testimony about his former roommate, Guram 
                                              
 
7
 The REAL ID Act provides that an adverse credibility 
determination can be based on inconsistencies, inaccuracies, 
and other factors, irrespective of whether they go to the heart 
of an applicant's claim.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).  
However, the REAL ID Act provisions governing credibility 
determinations do not apply here because Abulashvili‟s 
asylum application was filed on December 20, 2004, before 
the Act went into effect on May 11, 2005.  See Chukwu v. 
Att'y Gen., 484 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2007).  
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Kraveishvili.  The IJ questioned why Abulashvili had testified that 
the militia had tortured Kraveishvili when he refused to reveal 
Abulashvili‟s whereabouts, yet never mentioned in his application 
for asylum that Kraveishvili had been killed.  The IJ considered this 
omission to be a “very important” factor in her decision to deny 
Abulashvili‟s application for asylum.  (A.R. 98)   
 
Even a cursory review of Abulashvili‟s asylum application 
shows that the IJ was wrong.  On the third page of Abulashvili‟s 
statement in support of his written application, Abulashvili explained 
that his roommate had been arrested, beaten and tortured.  (A.R. 
367).   On the next page, Abulashvili wrote that Kraveishvili had 
been “found dead at the wall of Alvabar cemetery” and Abulashvili 
stated that it was then that he knew he had to leave Georgia “in order 
to escape a death.”  (A.R. 368).  Thus, not only did Abulashvili state 
that Kraveishvili had been killed, he added details such as where the 
body was found. 
 
Apparently, the IJ either never read Abulashvili‟s written 
statement, or she overlooked part of it and concluded that a 
nonexistent omission was "very important."  Either explanation is 
equally troubling.  If the purported conflict between that statement in 
his asylum application and Abulashvili‟s testimony was so critical to 
resolving his claim, the fact that the IJ didn‟t make a sufficient effort  
to determine what was actually in the application is both perplexing 
and disconcerting.  
 
Even worse, both the IJ and BIA were troubled by the 
different spellings of  the name of Abulashvili‟s former roommate in 
the record.  Abulashvili spelled the name as “Kraveishvili” in his 
application, yet the person transcribing the hearing testimony spelled 
the name as “Kravia Shvili.”  This is hardly the kind of discrepancy 
that a neutral fact finder would use to discredit one‟s testimony.  The 
explanation is so obvious that this purported “discrepancy” is hardly 
worth commenting on.  One does not need a doctorate in linguistics 
to realize that “Kravia Shvili” is a phonetic spelling of 
“Kraveishvili.”  After all, Abulashvili did not produce the transcript 
of his own hearing testimony; a stenographer almost certainly did.  It 
is also safe to assume that the stenographer was not fluent in 
Georgian and that s/he did not have an ear that was accustomed to 
Abulashvili‟s accent.  It is hard to understand how anyone could 
attach such importance to the two different spellings of the 
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roommate's name or conclude that it meant that Abulashvili was 
referring to two different individuals.    
 
Nonetheless, the BIA concluded that the two men were not 
the same because “Kraveishvili is described in [Abulashvili‟s] 
application as employing the services of the respondent‟s minibus.”  
(A.R. 420).  The BIA thought this inconsistent with Abulashvili‟s 
statement in his asylum application that Kraveishvili was his former 
roommate.  However, we know of nothing that would prevent 
someone‟s roommate from using certain services just because they 
happened to be owned by the person he was rooming with.  In his 
asylum application, Abulashvili stated that the Ministry of State 
Security “came for me in my former apartment in Tbilisi.”  (A.R. 
367).  In the next sentence, Abulashvili discussed how members of 
the Ministry “also arrested Guram Kraveishvili, member of LPG, 
who took in employment my minibus.”  (A.R. 367).  Taken together, 
these statements support an inference that Kraveishvili had been 
Abulashvili‟s roommate at some point, an assertion that Abulashvili 
made explicit at the hearing.    
 
Third, the IJ and BIA took issue with Abulashvili‟s 
description of where the  
18-year old passenger was shot.  The IJ pointed out that Abulashvili 
explained in his application that the girl had been shot outside his 
minibus, but testified at the hearing that the girl was shot inside and 
that he did not find her until his minibus had been cleared of all 
passengers.   
 
Abulashvili stated in his asylum application that he “placed 
[the girl] in minibus,” but never specified where the girl was shot.  
(A.R. 366).  Given the difficulty in comprehending much of 
Abulashvili‟s application, which was written without the aid of an 
interpreter, we are unclear whether placing the girl “in” the minibus 
can fairly be interpreted to mean moving the girl “inside” the 
minibus from outside.  At the hearing, Abulashvili stated that, when 
he had written that he placed the girl in the minibus, he simply 
meant that he moved the girl to the front seat so that she could 
receive more air and be more comfortable.  (A.R. 185).  There is 
nothing inconsistent with that explanation and a statement that the 
girl had in fact been shot inside the bus.  Although we certainly 
understand why this apparent inconsistency could fairly raise 
questions,  given all of the circumstances here, we have little 
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confidence that the IJ adequately considered Abulashvili‟s 
explanation.   
 
In addition, the IJ was baffled by the “sensibility of 
[Abulashvili] having moved the victim of a gunshot instead of 
rushing her off to the hospital.”  (A.R. 73).  The IJ‟s reaction to this 
portion of the testimony once again suggests that she either did not 
pay attention to what Abulashvili said, or she simply ignored some 
of the record.  Abulashvili did in fact state that he transported the 
girl to the hospital after the shooting both in his asylum application 
and his testimony.  (A.R. 144-45, 366).  The fact that he took a few 
minutes to rearrange the bleeding girl so that “she won‟t get any 
broken bones” and to secure her seat belt before driving to the 
hospital does not strike us as incredible.  (A.R. 185).  A neutral fact 
finder could just as easily have concluded that the addition of such 
seemingly inconsequential details made his testimony about the 
incident more credible, not less so. 
 
We recognize that there were some actual inconsistencies 
between the asylum application and Abulashvili‟s testimony.  For 
example, the IJ and BIA were concerned that Abulashvili never 
mentioned in his application that he feared returning to Georgia 
because his father had been an active member of the LPG, yet relied 
on this fact during the hearing.  Abulashvili explained at the hearing 
that he did not include this information in his application because he 
was relying on a friend to help him complete it, his friend had only a 
slightly better proficiency in English than he did, and that his friend 
was pressed for time.   
 
Abulashvili also explained that he did not mention this 
information during his interview with the asylum officer because the 
officer could not understand what Abulashvili was trying to say, cut 
Abulashvili off when he tried to speak, and ended the interview very 
early.   Abulashvili did not realize at the time that he could have 
brought along an interpreter, and stated that the officer never gave 
him the option of rescheduling the interview so that an interpreter 
could attend.   
 
We certainly do not suggest that the IJ or the BIA had to 
accept Abulashvili‟s explanations.   However, given the problems 
with the IJ‟s assessment of Abulashvili‟s testimony that we have 
already discussed, it is exceedingly difficult for us to conclude that 
Abulashvili‟s explanations were fairly considered.  
12 
 
 
The IJ and BIA also believed it was significant that 
Abulashvili testified at the hearing that the police confiscated the 
photos that he had taken outside of Buchukuri‟s mansion.  However, 
in his asylum application Abulashvili explained that he withheld the 
photos from the police and gave them to the LPG Chairman, Shalva 
Natelashvili.  When questioned about this apparent inconsistency, 
Abulashvili said that he meant that the police took his camera with 
his other belongings and returned the camera to him without the 
film.  He explained that he did not realize that the film was missing 
until he gave the camera to Natelashvili, who wanted to develop the 
photos. 
 
Finally, the IJ noted that there was an inconsistency between 
the number of times Abulashvili stated that he had been arrested.  
Abulashvili mentioned a third arrest at the hearing that he had not 
included in his application.  When the IJ pointed out the 
inconsistency, Abulashvili explained that he did not include his last 
arrest in the application because “it was not done by any kind of 
militia” and therefore not a “legal or official arrest.”  (A.R. 205).  
Although unclear from the record, it appears that although the 
individuals who seized Abulashvili during this last “arrest” 
purported to be from the militia, they may have merely been thugs.   
According to Abulashvili, these individuals took him to a building, 
where they blindfolded him, held him upside down, and threatened 
to kill him if he told anyone about the September 1998 events.  As 
we have just stated, the IJ did not have to accept this explanation.  
However, at least she did have to consider it.  Given the apparently 
cavalier approach to evaluating Abulashvili‟s claims, we are not at 
all sure that the explanation was given appropriate consideration.  
 
An adverse credibility finding must be afforded substantial 
deference so long as the finding is supported by sufficient, cogent 
reasons.  See Butt v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 430, 434 (3d Cir. 2005).  
We must evaluate whether the credibility determination was 
“appropriately based on inconsistent statements, contradictory 
evidences, and inherently improbable testimony . . . in view of the 
background evidence of country conditions.”  Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 
F.3d 215, 223 (3d Cir. 2004).  Thus, minor omissions or 
inconsistencies that do not go to the heart of an asylum applicant's 
claim cannot support an adverse credibility determination.  See Kaita 
v. Att’y Gen., 522 F.3d 288, 296 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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Here, the heart of Abulashvili‟s claim is that he would be 
persecuted if he returned to Georgia because he was a member of the 
LPG opposition party and knew about government corruption as 
evidenced by the September 1998 events.  Specifically, Abulashvili 
claims that he witnessed a government official‟s potential collusion 
with a Chechen insurgent and the killing of an innocent bystander.  
He claims that the Georgian government used its powers of 
persuasion – including threats of death, beatings, and torture –  to 
discourage him from revealing information about these incidents to 
fellow LPG party members, who could use that information to their 
political advantage.  
 
On this record, we cannot conclude that the discrepancies 
highlighted by the IJ and BIA undermine Abulashvili‟s claim.  
Indeed, as we have explained, some of the purported contradictions 
that the IJ relied upon are not contradictions at all, but resulted  from 
misreading Abulashvili‟s application, reading only part of it, or 
ignoring it.  To the extent that some unexplained inconsistencies 
remain, we are left questioning whether those inconsistencies were 
fairly evaluated.   
 
We also note that “asylum applicants are not required to list 
every incident of persecution on their I-589 statements.”  Pavlova v. 
INS, 441 F.3d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Pop v. INS, 270 F.3d 
527, 531-32 (7th Cir. 2001) (“We hesitate to find that one seeking 
asylum must state in his or her application every incident of 
persecution lest the applicant have his or her credibility questioned if 
the incident is later elicited in direct testimony.”).    
           
 Before concluding this part of our discussion, we also think it 
important to stress that the linguistic and cultural difficulties 
endemic in immigration hearings may frequently result in statements 
that appear to be inconsistent, but in reality arise from a lack of 
proficiency in English or cultural differences rather than attempts to 
deceive.
8
   
 
                                              
8
 We do not, of course, have any way of knowing all of the 
dynamics at work in this or any other immigration hearing 
based upon our review of a cold record.  However, given 
some of the very obvious and troubling problems that we 
have pointed out here, we think it useful to remind those 
involved in the process of these difficulties.   
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 Ironically, it is quite possible that Abulashvili undermined his 
own claim by testifying that he understood and spoke English.
9
  
Later, when denying Abulashvili‟s asylum claim, the IJ stated, “The 
fact that [Abulashvili] has spoken some English reassures the Court 
that the respondent does have an understanding of the language, and 
he testified to that effect as well.”  (A.R. 87). 
  
 Yet the IJ should have realized that Abulashvili‟s purported 
comprehension of English was not consistent with the difficulty he 
had in communicating, and that observation would have required 
neither familiarity with his language nor any particular expertise in 
communication theory.   
  
 The IJ herself later explained that the majority of 
Abulashvili‟s testimony was in Georgian, but that he “has peppered 
his testimony with English now and then.”  (A.R. 63).   In addition, 
portions of Abulashvili‟s asylum application are difficult to 
comprehend and extremely garbled.  For example, when describing 
the incident where the 18-year old passenger was shot, he explained, 
“I placed her in minibus and as crazy have gone aside nearby 
hospital in Azhmeta.  In car except of girl me a translator was.”  
(A.R. 366).  It is difficult to conclude that Abulashvili could 
adequately express himself in English.  That may explain why 
portions of his application are unclear.  Nevertheless, for all of the 
reasons we have explained, we hold that the adverse credibility 
determination is not supported by substantial evidence. 
B. Due Process 
 
Finally, Abulashvili argues that his due process rights were 
violated when IJ Garcy took over the cross-examination at the 
hearing after determining that the government was not adequately 
prepared.  Abulashvili contends that the IJ was no longer a neutral 
arbiter once she assumed the role of counsel.   As noted earlier, the 
IJ explained that she took such an active role in questioning to 
                                              
 
9
 At the initial hearing, the IJ asked Abulashvili‟s counsel 
what “your client‟s best language is,” to which Abulashvili 
responded “I speak Georgian, Russian, English.”  (A.R. 108).  
Abulashvili‟s counsel then asked Abulashvili “Which one‟s 
your best?,” to which Abulashvili responded “No, it‟s okay, I 
speak English.”  (A.R. 108).   Abulashvili was later provided 
a Georgian interpreter at the merits hearing. 
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ensure that Abulashvili could tell his side of the story and that she 
was therefore trying to ensure his due process rights were protected. 
(A.R. 421) 
 
“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all „persons‟ within the 
United States including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, 
unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”  Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 
678, 693 (2001).  To establish a due process violation, Abulashvili 
must show that he was denied “a full and fair hearing,” which 
includes a “neutral and impartial arbiter of the merits of his claim 
and a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on [his] behalf.”  
See Cham v. Att’y Gen., 445 F.3d 683, 691 (3d Cir. 2008).   “„No 
person [may] be deprived of his interests in the absence of a 
proceeding in which he may present his case with assurance that the 
arbiter is not predisposed to find against him.‟” Wang v. Att’y Gen., 
423 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 
446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980)).  We review alleged due process 
violations in deportation proceedings de novo.  Abdulrahman v. 
Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 595 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 
Here, IJ Garcy had every right to exercise her discretion to 
question Abulashvili.  See 8 USC § 1229a(b)(1).  However, “"[a]n 
immigration judge has a responsibility to function as a neutral, 
impartial arbiter and must refrain from taking on the role of advocate 
for either party."  Elias v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 444, 451 (6th Cir. 
2007). 
 The Due Process Clause cannot tolerate a situation where a 
supposedly neutral fact finder interjects herself into the proceedings 
to the extent of assuming the role of opposing counsel and taking 
over cross-examination for the government.  In doing so here, this IJ 
asked Abulashvili a total of 87 questions.  Not surprisingly, once the 
IJ began cross-examining Abulashvili, the government‟s attorney did 
not follow up with a single question.  (A.R. 209).  Why would he 
since an Immigration Judge was now doing his job for him?  We 
cannot imagine how the IJ could be deemed a neutral arbiter under 
such circumstances.  Moreover, even if she could somehow remain 
neutral in fact, the appearance was clearly to the contrary.  It is not 
the IJ‟s function to protect the government by becoming its counsel 
when its own  counsel is not prepared.     
 
IJs must “assiduously refrain from becoming advocates for 
either party.”  Abdulrahman, 330 F.3d at 596.  Even if the IJ did not 
intend to become an advocate for the government, “judicial conduct 
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[is] improper . . . whenever a judge appears biased, even if she 
actually is not biased.”  See In re Antar (SEC v. Antar), 71 F.3d 97, 
101 (3d Cir. 1995).  By stepping into the role of the attorney for the 
government, the IJ gave the strong impression that she was on the 
government‟s side.  It is difficult to conclude that Abulashvili 
received a “fair and full hearing” when the IJ ceased being the 
“neutral arbiter” due process demands and assumed the role of an 
advocate instead.  
 
We readily acknowledge that an IJ‟s position is an impossibly 
demanding and challenging one.  This has become increasingly 
obvious in recent years as IJs are confronted with an exponential 
growth in their caseloads.  The plight of immigration judges 
shoveling back a sea of cases has been chronicled in several news 
articles and law journals.
10
  In addition, it is often very difficult to 
                                              
10
 See, e.g., Casey Miner, Judges On the Verge of a Nervous 
Breakdown, Mother Jones, Nov. 1, 2010 (explaining that one 
immigration judge‟s docket in Minnesota was pushing 1,300 
cases at any given time, and that the judge sometimes 
conducted 50 hearings in a single day-one every eight 
minutes); Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to Representation for 
Detained Immigrants Facing Deportation, Fordham L. Rev 
545  (2009) (“One cannot exaggerate how overburdened and 
under-resourced the immigration courts are and how pro se 
cases tap those scarce resources disproportionately.  In fiscal 
year 2008, the nation‟s 214 immigration judges handled on 
average over 1500 cases apiece.  To assist them with this 
enormous docket, immigration judges shared, on average, one 
law clerk for every six judges.”); Howard Mintz, Immigration 
Judges Struggling, Chi. Trib., Sept. 10, 2009 (“Immigration 
courts have come under closer scrutiny in recent years as 
caseloads exploded across the country. The number of 
immigration cases jumped from more than 282,000 in 1998 to 
a projected 385,000 this year, with only a modest increase in 
the number of immigration judges.); Julia Preston, Study 
Finds Immigration Courtrooms Backlogged , N.Y. Times, 
June 18, 2009 (quoting Judge Dana L. Marks, president of the 
National Association of Immigration Judges, who explained 
that “[i]t‟s a system at its breaking point.  How can a system 
function properly when it is starved from the critical basic 
resources it needs?”). 
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ascertain the veracity of an asylum applicant‟s testimony given 
barriers of language and culture to which we have already alluded.  
Perhaps this is why the BIA concluded that IJ Garcy was merely 
engaged in a “ferreting out of the facts” and “acquiring clarity in 
[Abulashvili‟s] testimony,” as we noted above.  (A.R. 421).   
However, that explanation and the IJ‟s own explanation would be far 
more plausible if such interventions were as likely to favor the alien 
as the government and if the record established that the IJ fairly 
considered the entire record before making credibility 
determinations.  That does not appear to be the case.
11
  
Moreover, it is one thing for an IJ to ask questions, and quite 
another for an IJ to supplant the role of the government‟s attorney.  
On this record, we can have no confidence that the IJ was merely 
trying to ensure that Abulashvili had a full opportunity to tell his 
story because, as noted above, the IJ ignored crucial parts of his 
testimony in finding omissions that simply did not exist.  The Due 
Process Clause does not allow a neutral hearing officer to become 
the functional equivalent of counsel for one of the parties; yet, that is 
what appears to have happened here. 
IV. The Appropriate Remedy 
Where, as here, we reverse an adverse credibility 
finding, “the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to 
remand to the agency for additional investigation or 
explanation.”  INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 
                                              
11
 Unfortunately, this is not the first time that IJ Garcy‟s 
conduct in a hearing has come to our attention.  In Wang v. 
Att’y Gen., 423 F.3d 261, 269 (3d Cir. 2005), we were deeply 
troubled by her manner of questioning the asylum applicant 
and noted that her “tone, the tenor, the disparagement, and the 
sarcasm of the IJ seem more appropriate to a court television 
show than a federal court proceeding.”  Similarly, in Saleh v. 
Gonzales, 172 Fed.Appx. 471, 474 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(unpublished), we noted that “we would be remiss were we 
not to point out the unprofessional and inappropriate conduct 
of Judge Garcy, the IJ in this case.  On numerous occasions 
the Judge verbally attacked Mr. Saleh in a manner 
unbecoming of a neutral and detached arbitrator.”   
 
Here, unlike in other cases we have had to review, we 
do not take issue with the manner in which this IJ questioned 
Abulashvili.  Rather, we are troubled by the fact that she took 
over the cross-examination for the government.  
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(2002) (per curiam) (citation and quotation marks omitted); 
Butt, 429 F.3d at 437.  We will therefore vacate the BIA‟s 
order dated May 30, 2008 dismissing Abulashvili‟s 
application for withholding of removal and relief under the 
CAT.  We will also vacate the BIA‟s order dated April 30, 
2009 denying Abulashvili‟s motion to reopen since that was 
based on the BIA's affirmance of the IJ‟s adverse credibility 
determination.  In addition, we will remand the case to the 
BIA and instruct the agency to assess Abulashvili‟s evidence 
without considering the adverse credibility determination.  
See Senathirajah v. I.N.S., 157 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(remanding to BIA with instructions to remand to IJ for 
decision on asylum and withholding application, but without 
consideration of erroneous adverse credibility finding 
reversed on appeal). 
12
 
In the event that the BIA deems it appropriate to 
further remand this case to an IJ for another hearing, we 
strongly recommend that the agency refer the matter to a 
different IJ in light of the concerns that have arisen in this 
case, and the appearance of partiality that cannot now be put 
“back into the tube.”  See Cham v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 683, 
                                              
 
12
 In its April 30, 2009 decision and accompanying order, the 
BIA did not engage in any independent analysis with respect 
to Abulashvili‟s CAT claim, and merely treated it in passing 
at the end of its decision.  When considering a motion to 
reopen, the BIA must at the very least “actually consider the 
evidence and argument that a party presents.”  Abdulai v. 
Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001).  Abulashvili has 
submitted a detailed report from Mr. Abdoumannob Poulatov, 
a human rights advocate who has been widely recognized as 
an expert on country conditions in the former Soviet Union.  
According to the report, Poulatov opines that because of 
Abulashvili‟s membership in the LPG opposition party, he 
believes that Abulashvili “will most likely face possible 
intimidation, attack, and possibly even incarceration and/or 
torture, if he is forced to return to any part of Georgia.”  (S.A. 
29).  Although we certainly do not suggest that the BIA must 
accept Poulatov‟s conclusions, the agency should have at the 
very least considered them.  On remand, the BIA should 
carefully consider the evidence presented in support of 
Abulashvili‟s withholding of removal and CAT claims.   
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694 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 
627, 638 (3d Cir. 2006)).  “[W]hile we „recognize that 
assignment of an [IJ] is within the province of the Attorney 
General,‟ if on remand an IJ‟s services are needed, we believe 
„the parties would be far better served by the assignment to 
those proceedings of a different IJ.‟” Korytnyuk v. Ashcroft, 
396 F.3d 272, 287 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Paramasamy v. 
Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 1047, 1055 n.4 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
V. Conclusion 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we hold that the BIA 
erred in dismissing Abulashvili‟s application for withholding 
of removal and protection under the CAT.  We further hold 
that the BIA abused its discretion in denying Abulashvili‟s 
motion to reopen.  Finally, we hold that Abulashvili‟s due 
process rights were violated when the IJ assumed the role of 
the government‟s attorney.  We will therefore grant the 
petition for review, vacate the orders of the BIA, and remand 
the matter to the BIA for additional proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
 
